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The  ongoing  financial  meltdown 
threatens to spawn the most severe 
economic  slump  in  several  business 
cycles,  possibly  the  worst  since  the 
Great  Depression.    As  in  the  early 
1990s following the savings and loan 
crisis, ground zero this time is also in 
financial activities, and the weakness 
extends beyond banks to brokerages, 
trusts,  insurers,  and  realtors.    The 
pain is certain to spread beyond these 
industries  to  the  general  economy.   
Financial activities leave a large foot-
print in the Nutmeg State, making it 
particularly vulnerable to a downturn 
originating in this sector.  What are 
the causes of the meltdown and how 
toxic is the fallout to which the state 
may be exposed?
ORIGINS OF A CRISIS
  The  current  financial  crisis  has 
its  roots  in  the  debris  of  the  dot-
com boom that went bust earlier this 
decade. To prod the economy out of 
recession, the Federal Reserve slashed 
interest rates to historically low levels 
and, buoyed by a flood of savings from 
emerging nations, kept them there for 
years.  Mortgage rates plunged, people 
snatched up real estate and prices took 
off.  Despite warnings of an emerging 
speculative  bubble,  Alan  Greenspan’s 
Fed  was  reluctant  to  close  the  mon-
etary spigot.  Perhaps as significant, it 
was  philosophically  averse  to  beefing 
up  regulatory  oversight  of  financial 
markets.
  With  interest  rates  at  rock  bot-
tom, mortgage lenders began offering 
loans to more marginal buyers.  Thus 
were  born  the  now  infamous  sub-
prime mortgages, extended with little 
or no money down and with low teaser 
interest rates that would later adjust to 
higher levels.  Many buyers planned to 
avoid the rate resets by reselling their 
homes at a profit or, flush with equity, 
refinancing at a lower fixed rate.  Many 
existing  owners  turned  their  homes 
into ATMs by taking out home equity 
loans to finance other investments or 
consumer purchases.
  In  this  low-rate  environment, 
investors sought higher returns on their 
money.   Wall  Street  got  into  the  act 
by pooling mortgages of various kinds 
(that  mortgage  lenders  were  eager  to 
resell  to  intermediaries)  and  issuing 
mortgage-backed securities whose val-
ues  derived  from  the  principal  and 
interest  payments  of  the  underlying 
loans. However dubious their lineage 
and difficult to price for resale, credit 
rating agencies routinely assigned these 
securities AAA ratings. 
  Eventually,  as  buyers  became 
increasingly  overextended  and  teaser 
rates  expired,  mortgage  delinquencies 
and defaults soared, home prices col-
lapsed, and the values of those mort-
gage-backed  securities  came  crashing 
down.  The consequent solvency prob-
lems  caused  credit  markets  to  seize 
up, and even healthy businesses were 
loath to lend to one another for fear of 
unknown skeletons that might be lurk-
ing in their portfolios.
  Exposure  to  mortgage-backed 
securities sounded the death knell for 
some  of  the  most  venerable  names 
in  the  financial  world.  Bear  Sterns 
and Merrill Lynch were swallowed up 
by  heartier  institutions,  and  Lehman 
Brothers disappeared altogether.  The 
federal  government  put  new  capital 
into  Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac, 
and then assumed control.  Insurance 
giant AIG, on the hook for the credit 
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economy.default swaps it sold to investors seek-
ing  a  hedge  against  losses  in  mort-
gage-backed  securities,  sold  the  U.S. 
government a substantial claim on its 
equity in return for a huge loan to stay 
afloat.
BlAST FROM ThE PAST
  The financial meltdown has elicit-
ed many comparisons with the wrench-
ing gyrations the U.S. economy under-
went  during  the  Great  Depression.   
But  there  are,  thankfully,  significant 
differences.  Then, the market was in 
free  fall  for  years,  plunging  by  89% 
between  September  1929  and  July 
1932.  Now the venerable Dow-Jones 
Industrial Average is down only 40%, 
though the drop has occurred within 
the  short  space  of  one  year.    Then, 
unemployment reached 25%, and the 
economy surrendered one entire year’s 
worth  of  output  between  1929  and 
1934.    Now  unemployment  stands 
above 6%, and the latest GDP num-
bers are off only a fraction of a percent, 
though the smart money is betting on 
worse news to come.
  This  time  around,  the  policy 
response to the current crisis has been 
more  surefooted.    Then,  President 
Hoover  raised  taxes  and  the  Federal 
Reserve  tightened  the  money  sup-
ply, greatly aggravating the severity of 
the recession.  Now, no one’s talking 
about  boosting  taxes  any  time  soon, 
and  monetary  policy  has  been  emi-
nently accommodative.  FDIC insur-
ance has so far assuaged nervous bank 
depositors,  and  automatic  stabilizers 
like unemployment insurance and the 
earned income tax credit, which didn’t 
exist in the 1930s, are quietly doing 
their work.  
  What’s more, whereas during the 
Depression the government embraced 
extreme efforts at resuscitation only late 
in the process, this time policy makers 
are intervening relatively early on, and 
heeding  the  lessons  of  last  century’s 
crisis.  Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, 
a  student  of  the  Great  Depression, 
credits two Depression-era institutions 
with helping to lift the country out of 
its economic funk. The Reconstruction 
Finance  Corporation  (RFC)  made 
loans  and  even  bought  equity  stakes 
in  banks  and  other  businesses,  and 
the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 
(HOLC) refinanced mortgages to pre-
vent foreclosures.  Strains of both can 
be found in the current rescue effort. 
  Although  Treasury  Secretary 
Paulson’s original bailout proposal was 
limited to purchasing the toxic assets 
held  by  financial  institutions,  in  its 
final  form  the  program  allowed  the 
Treasury to buy equity stakes in and 
help recapitalize banks and other play-
ers, much as did the RFC.  The finan-
cial  infusion  is  aimed  at  ending  the 
institutional hoarding of cash and get-
ting credit flowing through the system 
again.  And the Hope for Homeowners 
(H4H) bill, like HOLC, is meant to 
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Luckily, this time around 
the federal policy response 




SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy, based on data from 
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0.81 to 1.01 (15 states)
0.56 to 0.81 (19 states)help keep at-risk homeowners in their 
homes, reduce the overhang of hous-
ing, and give prices a chance to firm 
up.    But  the  plan,  which  guarantees 
banks  90%  of  the  newly  appraised 
value of a home in exchange for con-
verting an existing mortgage into a tra-
ditional 30-year fixed-rate loan and a 
government cut in any gain on a future 
sale, is entirely voluntary. 
BEAN COUNTING
  Connecticut  has  a  high  concen-
tration  of  jobs  in  financial  activities.   
U.S.  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis 
(BEA) data for 2007 show that more 
than 7.5% of jobs in the state were in 
the  financial  activities  sector,  versus 
just  4.7%  nationally.    The  ratio  of 
these percentages (7.5% / 4.7%), the 
so-called  location  quotient  (or  LQ), 
comes  to  1.61.    Any  number  above 
1.0 indicates that a region is relatively 
more specialized in an industry than is 
the U.S. as a whole.  Thus Connecticut 
has  a  61%  greater  concentration  of 
economic activity in finance than aver-
age (see map p. 5), ranking us second 
in the country after Delaware (1.84), 
but  well  ahead  of  New  York  (1.38).   
Our centerfold, which maps financial 
activity LQs by town in Connecticut, 
shows the heavy concentration of the 
industry in the Stamford and Hartford 
areas.
  The  financial  activities  sector  is 
composed of four smaller sub-sectors: 
banks, securities, insurance, and funds-
&-trusts.    Connecticut’s  LQ  exceeds 
1.0 in each of these sub-sectors except 
banking  (0.90).    (Connecticut  also 
is  about  average  (LQ  =  0.97)  in  the 
finance-related real estate sector, which 
was arguably the first domino to fall 
in the current financial collapse.) The 
Constitution State leads the nation in 
the  concentration  of  insurance  jobs 
(2.09), and ranks second in securities 
(1.89)  and  third  in  funds-&-trusts 
(2.26).
  Regional economic theory suggests 
that industries with location quotients 
greater  than  1.0  serve  as  engines  of 
economic  growth.    LQs  greater  than 
1.0 signify a level of production that 
is more than sufficient to supply local 
demand for industry output.  The sur-
plus can be exported to other states and 
other countries, earn industry workers 
high  incomes,  and  spur  a  beneficent 
“multiplier  process”  that  creates  new 
jobs  and  higher  incomes  for  others 
within  the  region,  as  these  industry 
workers  spend  their  earnings  in  the 
local economy.  
  BEA calculates industry multipli-
ers  for  each  state  in  the  country.  A 
regression of these multipliers against 
state  LQs  across  all  the  finance  sub-
sectors shows that an “average” state, 
with an LQ of 1.0, will have a finan-
cial activities multiplier of about 2.2.   
Thus, adding a job in banking, secu-
rities,  insurance  or  the  related  real 
estate sector adds another 1.2 jobs to 
the state’s economy for a total of 2.2 
jobs  altogether.    For  funds-&-trusts, 
though,  the  statistical  evidence  sug-
gests  a  significantly  higher  multiplier 
of 2.9.  So a new job in this sector adds 
nearly two additional jobs elsewhere in 
the economy. 
  States  that  have  a  higher-than-
average concentration of jobs in finan-
cial  activities  are  apt  to  have  larger 
multipliers in these industries.  States 
with financial LQs of 2.0, for exam-
ple, tend to have multipliers of about 
2.6 rather than 2.2, so increasing the 
LQ by 1.0 increases the multiplier by 
0.4.  Insurance and funds-&-trusts are 
even  more  responsive  to  an  increase 
in  industry  concentration.    Raising 
the LQ from 1.0 to 2.0 in insurance 
increases  the  multiplier  from  2.2  to 
3.2.    The  same  change  in  funds-&-
trusts  raises  that  industry’s  multiplier 
from 2.9 to 4.3.
  Given Connecticut’s LQs in bank-
ing, securities and real estate, its mul-
tipliers are about what you’d expect—
2.2, 2.7, and 2.2 respectively.  But its 
multiplier for insurance, 3.1, is about 
0.7 below the predicted value, while its 
multiplier  for  funds-&-trusts,  7.1,  is 
1.8 jobs higher than the model would 
suggest.
WhAT GOES UP MUST COME 
DOWN?
  In  an  expanding  economy,  the 
multiplier  process  spurs  a  virtuous 
cycle of increased output, earnings and 
jobs.  But when the economy falls on 
hard  times,  the  multiplier  shifts  into 
reverse, so that the ultimate impact of a 
small reduction in economic activity is 
something worse than the initial drop.
  That  is  a  particularly  worrisome 
possibility when the industry in ques-
tion  is  financial  activities,  with  its 
larger  than  average  multipliers,  and 
when the state under the microscope is 
Connecticut, with its higher-than-aver-
age concentration of jobs in the indus-
try. How might Connecticut respond 
to a sucker punch square in the middle 
of the financial services industry?
  Today’s economic narrative shares 
many  common  threads  with  the  last 
recession  to  shake  the  financial  ser-
vices  industry,  in  the  early  1990s.   
That rocky stretch was bracketed by a 
1987 stock market crash that cleaved 
nearly 40 percent from the Dow and 
Hurricane  Andrew’s  1992  rampage 
through  southern  Florida  and  south-
west Louisiana that cost the insurance 
industry  billions.    Throughout  the 
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Banks 33,821 -8.5% -2,875 2.2 -6,461 $53,050 -$343
Securities 50,547 -13.4% -6,773 2.7 -18,219 $58,991 -$1,075
Insurance 74,550 -2.5% -1,864 3.1 -5,786 $54,501 -$315
Trusts 9,036 -30.6% -2,765 7.1 -19,632 $61,035 -$1,198
Real Estate 97,341 -16.7% -16,256 2.2 -36,495 $31,994 -$1,168
Total 265,295 -11.5% -30,533 2.8 -86,593 $47,333 -$4,099WINTER 2009  THE CONNECTICUT ECONOMY  7 
period,  savings  and  loans  collapsed 
in droves, following years of unsound 
real estate lending, and the real estate 
industry  went  into  a  tailspin  as  new 
home  construction  dropped  from  an 
annual rate of 1.8 million to 1.0 mil-
lion units.  
  In  percentage  terms,  the  typical 
state suffered single-digit job losses in 
insurance  and  banking,  but  losses  in 
the teens in real estate and securities.   
Connecticut  lost  half  its  workforce 
in  real  estate,  one-third  in  banking 
and  about  10  percent  in  insurance 
and  securities.   The  state’s  job  losses 
were aggravated by the post-Cold War 
shakeout  in  defense-related  manufac-
turing,  something  that  is  unlikely  to 
play a role in the current recession.
  Suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that financial job losses in Connecticut 
this time around are held to the 50-
state  average  of  the  1990s.    (In  the 
’90s, industry job losses were uncorre-
lated with state LQs.) Direct industry 
losses would likely top 30,000, while 
multiplier  effects  would  trigger  addi-
tional  reductions  elsewhere  of  more 
than 55,000 (see table). So total job 
cuts could approach 90,000.  Worker 
earnings  could  slump  by  $4  billion, 
and  the  state’s  take  of  tax  revenue 
(which averages 9 percent for income, 
sales  and  other  taxes)  would  drop 
nearly $375 million.  
  That  estimated  thumping  to  the 
budget is conservative, since earnings 
in financial activities are more likely to 
be taxed at a higher marginal rate than 
average.    And  the  larger-multiplier 
securities  industry  is  likely  to  take  a 
bigger hit this time than is real estate, 
at  least  in  Connecticut.    Plus,  the 
model doesn’t include the more than 
25,000 Connecticut workers who live 
in-state  but  commute  to  Manhattan, 
many of them to work jobs in financial 
activities that may be on the chopping 
block.  Finally, we’re assuming that the 
financial sector as a whole will fare no 
worse in this meltdown than it did in 
the last.
  Under  all  these  conditions,  it  is 
easy  to  see  how  the  state  might  be 
facing a budget shortfall exceeding $1 
billion in this fiscal year. Connecticut 
had planned for a 4.7 percent, or $800 
million, increase in the state’s budget 
from  last  fiscal  year.  Since  earnings 
have  been  growing  at  a  4.7  percent 
annual rate in Connecticut this decade, 
that  increase  seemed  entirely  reason-
able.  But if earnings are flat instead, 
as they were both in 1991 during the 
earlier finance-related recession, and in 
2001 after the dot.com boom, and if 
the slump in financial services costs the 
state another $375 million in tax rev-
enue, then . . . well, you do the math.   
If the slump extends through the next 
fiscal year, the gap could easily exceed 
$2 billion.
IN ThE SAME BOAT  
(ONly MORE SO)
  Assuming  that  Connecticut  sus-
tains  industry  cuts  that  are  no  more 
severe  than  in  the  “average”  state  is 
not just a wild guess.  Financial activi-
ties  losses  in  the  early  1990s  were 
uncorrelated  with  LQs,  so  states  like 
Connecticut,  with  higher  concentra-
tions of jobs in financial services were 
no  more  likely  than  other  states  to 
suffer  larger  percentage  job  losses  in 
the industry. That is cold comfort to 
the Nutmeg State, where a heavy con-
centration in financial activities brings 
with it large multipliers, so a given loss 
of  jobs  or  earnings  within  financial 
activities has more dire consequences 
for the broader economy here than it 
does elsewhere.
  As  the  accompanying  scatterplot 
shows,  the  full  impact  of  a  financial 
sector  meltdown  is  apt  to  be  more 
serious  in  Connecticut  than  in  near-
ly  any  other  state,  including  New 
York.  Only California and Colorado 
are  likely  to  find  the  going  tougher 
than  Connecticut,  with  its  projected 
declines in jobs (3.9%) and earnings 
(2.9%), and the resulting impacts on 
the budget. States with smaller indus-
try concentrations and smaller multi-
pliers will find more shelter from the 
impending storm.
  Of course, no one knows whether 
the  ongoing  meltdown  in  financial 
activities will be more or less severe than 
last time. But the clouds on the hori-
zon appear ominous, so the industry’s 
slump in the 1990s, its worst in forty 
years, at least serves as a useful bench-
mark. Under even modest assumptions, 
the  damage  to  Connecticut,  with  its 
high concentration of jobs in financial 
activities and large multipliers, is apt to 
be significant. With the stakes so high, 
no state should be rooting more loudly 
for the success of the financial industry 
rescue  package  than  Connecticut,  or 
praying more earnestly for a merciful 
end to the current business cycle.  












SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy, based on BEA data.
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